


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Nationalist China's Aid Programs in Africa

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
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NATIONALIST CHINA'S AID PROGRAMS IN AFRICA

The Republic of China has had a modest but highly effective economic assistance program in Africa since 1961. The program has been focused primarily on agricultural assistance and training, but military aid has been granted on a very limited scale. The Nationalist Chinese aid programs have been flexible, pragmatic, and low-keyed.

The political aim of the aid has been to maintain the support of a majority of African nations for Taiwan's present status in the United Nations, and there is no question that in this respect the program has been very successful.


Any significant expansion of Taiwan's assistance programs in Africa is unlikely because of a shortage of funds and trained personnel. In dealing with the "uncommitted" countries of Africa, however, the Nationalist Chinese will probably continue to show more finesse and flexibility than Peking.



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NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN AFRICA



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Nature of the Aid

The Republic of China's aid program in Africa, which began with the dispatch of a small agricultural survey team to Liberia in early 1961, now involves over 700 Nationalist Chinese technicians in 21 African countries. The primary focus of the aid has been agricultural assistance and training, the area in which the Chinese believe their experience is most relevant to the requirements of developing nations.

Since 1961, Nationalist China has spent about \$25 million on aid programs to Africa, compared with about \$120 million in economic aid and about \$80 million in military aid expended by Peking over a somewhat longer period. The Nationalists have substantially increased their appropriations for African aid each year, spending about \$11 million during 1968. A major portion of the aid is administered under Operation Vanguard, through which Taiwan also administers technical assistance programs in other areas of the world on a much smaller scale. Operation Vanguard is partially underwritten by the United States through PL-480 counterpart funds.

The pattern of Nationalist Chinese aid has been to send a small survey team to ascertain the requirements of the recipient country, followed by a farm demonstration team. If the response to the demonstration team warrants, the program is expanded to provide larger scale extension services. Most of the programs are currently in the demonstration-team phase.

Taipei has been more successful than Peking in establishing a presence in as many countries as possible with a limited amount of aid.

Of the various agricultural assistance projects, those dealing with rice production have been most successful. In the Ivory Coast, where the Nationalist Chinese have one of their largest complements, Chinese technical assistance has been a major factor in the substantial increase in rice production since 1961, and the Ivory Coast now expects to be self-sufficient in rice production by 1970. Another notable project was the adaptation of Taiwanese rice strains for use in Cameroon, which has resulted in yields of up to ten times those of local varieties.

Taiwan thus far has not been involved in any nonagricultural prestige projects, such as the sports arenas and theatres constructed by the Chinese Communists in several African countries.

Up to the present, Taipei has almost entirely avoided military assistance in its aid to Africa, in contrast to the extensive military aid programs of Communist China in several African countries. Nationalist aid has consisted primarily of Africans being brought to Taiwan for training in security and intelligence.

Tactics

The Chinese Nationalists have been flexible and pragmatic

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NATIONALIST CHINESE PROJECTS IN AFRICA

COUNTRY	TYPE OF MISSION	1968 BUDGET FIGURE
Botswana	Agricultural	\$ 92,555
Cameroon	Agricultural	328,800
Central African Republic	Agricultural	Unknown
Chad	Agricultural, veterinary oil plant	804,544
Congo (Kinshasa)	Agricultural	350,427
Dahomey	Agricultural	905,310
Ethiopia	Veterinary	61,288
Gabon	Agricultural	442,259
Gambia	Agricultural	152,470
Ghana	Agricultural	Unknown
Ivory Coast	Agricultural	1,036,078
Lesotho	Agricultural	Unknown
Liberia	Agricultural	194,026
Libya	Medical aid	Unknown
Malagasy Republic	Agricultural	128,334
Malawi	Agricultural	202,902
Niger	Agricultural	1,130,112
Rwanda	Agricultural, sugar mill	425,456
Senegal	Agricultural	141,509
Sierra Leone	Agricultural	712,120
Togo	Agricultural	272,512
Upper Volta	Agricultural	566,482
	TOTAL	\$8,081,668

Note:
Actual aid expenditures totaled approximately \$11,000,000 during 1968
because of supplementary expenditures and unknown figures noted above.

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in meeting the particular needs of individual countries. For example, when a rice-growing project in Libya turned into a minor fiasco, the emphasis was quickly shifted to a large-scale medical assistance program involving the assignment of almost 150 medical personnel to the Libyan Army. Similarly, when seasickness, boredom, and the language barrier prevented Cameroonian trainees from making effective use of assistance in commercial fishing, the Nationalists shifted their energies to more appropriate agricultural projects.

In addition to technical expertise, a major factor contributing to the relative success of Taiwan's aid effort has been its low-key approach. The Nationalists have not attempted to meddle in domestic political affairs. Unlike the Communists, they have not given any verbal or material support to black nationalist movements in Africa. Taipei has, however, carefully downplayed its ties with white supremacist South Africa in order to avoid offending black African nations.

Taiwan has maintained a relatively small physical presence in individual African countries. The largest contingent is in Libya--about 270 people--but most other missions consist of less than 50 people. Communist China, on the other hand, maintains over 1,000 technicians and laborers in Tanzania, and--until recently, at least--had a similar number in Mali.

On several occasions, the Nationalist Chinese have had to decline overtures from various African leaders for an expansion of their presence. President Banda of Malawi, for example, allegedly was so impressed by the accomplishments of Nationalist technicians in his country that he invited Chinese farm families to immigrate to serve as models of the Chinese methods of intensive farming. In a typical display of sensitivity to African conditions, Taipei turned down Dr. Banda's request because it was afraid the immigrants would be so successful they would cause anti-Chinese resentment. The Chinese were also concerned that the lack of supply and distribution facilities in Malawi might cause the immigrants to abandon agriculture in favor of commerce, repeating a trend that has occurred in most Overseas Chinese communities. In several other instances, the success of Taiwan's agricultural assistance programs has resulted in requests by host countries for assistance in other sectors of economic activity such as transportation and industry, which the Chinese are less well equipped to supply.

Another factor in Taiwan's success has been its insistence that natives of the host nation participate effectively in assistance projects. The Nationalist Chinese claim that their faith in the ability of Africans to help themselves is greater than that of Westerners, and, by implication, that they are thus better able to communicate with

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Africans. Moreover, the Chinese, unlike Westerners, have been willing to live among the Africans under indigenous conditions.

One undesirable Nationalist Chinese practice, which apparently is now being de-emphasized, is that of giving outright cash gifts to African leaders. This type of "aid" can be counter-productive because of the possibility that a successor regime could use such a "bribe" as political ammunition against the giver. Successful agricultural projects, however, provide little basis for anti-Chinese agitation.

Political Implications

The basic motivation of Taiwan's aid programs in Africa is political--to maintain the support of a majority of African countries for the present status of Nationalist China in the United Nations. There is no question that in this respect Taiwan's aid to Africa has been remarkably successful. In late 1964, 17 African nations had diplomatic ties with Peking, while only 15 maintained relations with Nationalist China. Since then, however, the situation has been reversed dramatically, with Taipei now maintaining ties with 21 African countries while only 13 nations still have relations with Peking.

Africa has been the key to the small but significant increase in support for Nationalist China in the United Nations in the past several years. Obviously factors beyond Taipei's

immediate control have also been involved, e.g., negative reactions to heavy-handed Chinese Communist behavior and changes in African governments, but the success of Taiwan's aid programs has clearly been a positive factor.

It should be noted, however, that there are differences in the objectives of Peking and Taipei in Africa. The Communists are primarily concerned with countering Soviet and Western political influence, and thus far have chosen to ignore Taipei's effort to create a sphere of influence in Africa.

The political importance of Taiwan's economic involvement in Africa has occasionally proved to be a two-edged sword. The fundamentally pragmatic and opportunistic approach of many African leaders to foreign aid has in some instances prompted them to use diplomatic support as a lever with which to secure more generous treatment. Morocco, for example, [redacted] threatened recently that unless Taiwan made all of its phosphate purchases from Morocco, Rabat 25X1 would "change its attitude" on the question of admitting Communist China to the UN.

Prospects

Significant expansion of Taiwan's assistance programs in Africa would be inhibited at present by a shortage of funds and trained personnel. Taiwan's commitment of a large portion of its resources to the military establishment

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will continue to preclude any major increases in foreign assistance. The limited number of technically qualified personnel will militate against any large-scale expansion of agricultural assistance programs into the extension service stage, as well as against any large-scale assistance in other sectors of economic activity.

There is also a political barrier to further expansion of Nationalist Chinese aid programs in Africa because of the hostility of the governments in almost all of the countries which do not currently receive Nationalist aid. If, however, Taipei continues to show the same alertness and opportunism that it did in the cases of Ghana and Dahomey, where there were abrupt changes of government, the Nationalists stand a good chance of being able to extend their influence even further.

If Peking, on the other hand, continues to expend greater

resources in Africa in conjunction with an intensification of its recent efforts to present a more moderate image, the Chinese Communists could significantly weaken Taiwan's diplomatic position. Given the pragmatic attitude of many African leaders toward foreign aid, Taiwan's relatively limited resources could not compete with a systematic Chinese Communist aid offensive.

Communist China, however, sees its principal competitors in Africa as the Soviet Union and the United States, and has thus far chosen to ignore Taiwan's aid programs. Furthermore, the Nationalist Chinese will probably continue to display more flexibility than the Communists in dealing with the "uncommitted" countries of Africa. Consequently, Taiwan's efficiently administered, low-keyed assistance programs should continue to yield the desired benefits.

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